Is Russia shadowing satellites that aid Ukraine from orbit?

A Russian military satellite has maneuvered to within a few hundred metres of a U.S.-registered radar satellite that is believed to supply intelligence to Ukraine, according to space‑tracking data reported by The War Zone, a U.S. defence news outlet. The satellite, Cosmos 2612, reportedly passed close to ICEYE‑X36, a satellite owned by the U.S. arm of Finnish company ICEYE.

LeoLabs, an American space‑tracking firm, placed the closest approach at roughly 500 metres, as cited by Breaking Defence. ICEYE has been providing radar imagery to Ukraine since 2022, Defence News noted.

**What happened?**
Cosmos 2612 is one of six satellites launched by the Russian military in April, according to The War Zone. In May, four of those satellites moved near an ICEYE satellite. ICEYE‑X36 is a commercial platform, owned by a private firm rather than a government, but the company sells radar data to militaries and supplies imagery to the United States and its allies. ICEYE chief executive Rafal Modrzewski told Reuters that the company then repositioned its own satellite, an action that appeared to trigger further Russian maneuvers. Between Thursday and Friday of last week, Cosmos 2612 reduced its distance from more than 320 km (200 miles) to about 4.8 km (3 miles) from ICEYE‑X36, LeoLabs reported to Axios. Over the weekend the Russian satellite shifted ahead of and behind the ICEYE craft, at times coming within roughly 500 metres, before beginning to move away by Monday, LeoLabs said.

A Ukrainian official confirmed to Axios that Ukraine’s armed forces work with ICEYE and use its capabilities, but could not say whether ICEYE‑X36 itself is directly supporting Kyiv.

**Has Russia done this before and why?**
Mark Hilborne, senior lecturer in defence studies at King’s College London, told Al Jazeera that Russia has previously carried out similar close‑approach maneuvers against Western military satellites, not commercial ones. In early 2020 two Russian satellites moved close to USA 245, a U.S. spy satellite. In September 2025 German defence minister Boris Pistorius said two Russian Luch‑Olymp satellites were tracking two Intelsat satellites used by the German military.

Dr Marco Langbroek, a lecturer in optical space situational awareness at TU Delft, said that at geostationary altitude Russian satellites LUCH/OLYMP‑K 1 and 2 have repeatedly approached Western communication satellites to distances of a few tens of kilometres, likely to eavesdrop on communications and data transfers. He added that Russia has also practiced very close approaches in low Earth orbit, similar to the recent ICEYE‑X36 incident, using its own satellites as test targets.

Langbroek warned that approaching another satellite without the owner’s consent is widely regarded as unsafe because it raises the risk of collision or interference, likening it to a car driving within a few centimetres of another vehicle on a highway. He said the purpose of the maneuver is unclear, but it could be a rehearsal for a future attack, a provocation intended to unsettle Ukraine and its allies, or a test of how satellite operators respond to such a threat. He placed the episode within the broader pattern of “hybrid warfare,” comparable to Russian drone incursions into Polish airspace or low‑altitude passes of NATO warships in the Baltic Sea.

**How common are such incidents?**
Close approaches have occurred for years, but Hilborne noted this is the first time a country has executed such a maneuver against a commercial satellite without any consent, and at an exceptionally short distance—some reports suggest less than 30 metres. More frequent is interference that does not require physical proximity, such as ground‑based jamming that drowns out a satellite’s signals. Western military officials have told Reuters that Russian interference with Western space systems has risen sharply since the full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

**Why does it matter?**
Hilborne argues that targeting a commercial satellite signals that Russia may no longer distinguish between civilian and military space assets. This is significant because militaries, including Ukraine’s, increasingly rely on commercial platforms for communications and imagery. Moscow has warned of such possibilities; in October 2022 a senior Russian foreign‑ministry official told the United Nations that “quasi‑civilian infrastructure may be a legitimate target for a retaliatory strike.” Juliana Suess, a space‑security researcher at the German Institute, echoed concerns about the growing vulnerability of civilian‑owned space assets.